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1958] SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION 
SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION AND DEFENDANTS' 
RIGHTS* 
B. ]. George, Jr.t 
37 
ADVANCES in science, medicine and industry have made much of the world a more pleasant place in which to live. In gen-
eral more men are living a physically more satisfying life in more 
comfortable surroundings than preceding generations. But with 
this has come a parallel increase in criminality to the point that 
the term "crime wave" is heard with increasing frequency. Many 
crimes are facilitated in their commission by adaption or appli-
cation of new scientific discoveries by criminal elements. A natural 
consequence is that already overburdened police departments 
turn as quickly as is financially possible to new scientific techniques 
in an effort to stem the flood. That more suspects are apprehended 
as a result cannot be gainsaid. 
Experience indicates, however, that almost anyone in a com-
munity may be suspected by the police. A great many innocent 
persons have their privacy invaded or their liberty curtailed in 
the course of police investigation. Constitutional and legal rights 
of persons who have committed crimes are often ignored by the 
police. These practices have always existed, but the problems have 
become more acute through the increased number of techniques 
available to the police. 
There are of course extra-legal community controls on certain 
kinds of police practices.1 Survey techniques may determine the 
extent to which communal pressures are effective controls, but 
from a lawyer's point of view it is difficult to reduce them to a sys-
tem. The balance between scientific investigating techniques and 
•Background paper submitted for the fifth International Congress of Comparative 
Law, Brussels, Belgium, August 4-9, 1958.-Ed. 
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1 For example, community disapproval of all or some forms of violent or abusive 
treatment of arrested or detained persons may today deter their use in a great many 
communities. Bad publicity may affect adversely the level of appropriations for police 
use. A legislative investigation into police activities, even though no curative legislation 
results, often has at least a temporary deterrent effect. 
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defendants' rights must be struck in the law courts by rules of law, 
and it is with these legal controls that this paper deals. 
Direct legal controls on police activities are relatively few in 
number. Th.e law of arrest determines when the citizen may be 
taken into custody and the maximum permissible time of his 
detention.2 No physical abuse is permitted. Officers who transgress 
these requirements are subject to civil suit for damages and often 
to criminal prosecution. But so long as they stay within these 
bounds there is little in the way of direct control over police sur-
veillance and scientific investigation. The main controls have come 
into being through indirection. The motivation for much of police 
investigation is procurement of evidence which will be adduced 
in court to secure a judgment of guilt -against the criminal. Al-
though the statement is often made that anything is available as 
evidence unless there is some specific reason why it should not be 
admitted,3 the reasons for non-admission are numerous enough 
that one may say that each new kind of evidence must make its 
own way toward an established position. The obstacles to admis-
sibility are found in the law of evidence, in substantive statute law 
and in the constitutions. 
Controls Arising From the Law of Evidence 
Information derived through scientific police investigation 
must for the most part be offered as expert testimony which tends 
to establish circumstantially one of the elements necessary to be 
proved to sustain the allegations of the indictment or informa-
tion.4 Before expert testimony may be admitted, it is necessary that 
the method used and testified to must be considered scientifically 
sound by the court, that the person called to testify be qualified 
to use the device or method, that the particular test or investigation 
be properly carried out, that possibility of error or substitution be 
substantially ruled out and that there be no policy of the law of 
evidence which prevents the qualified expert from testifying. 
2 A survey of state arrest law is to be found in the Commentary to the American Law 
Institute Code of Criminal Procedure, Official Draft, §§1-38 (1930). See also Waite, "Public 
Policy and ,the Arrest of Felons," 31 MICH. L. REv. 749 (1933); and Symposium, "Are the 
Courts Handcuffing the Police?" 52 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. l (1957). 
3 l WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §10 (1940). 
4 The defense may of course wish to offer such evidence if favorable to its position. 
Most of the cases, however, have arisen from prosecution efforts to submit opinion 
evidence based on scientific investigation over defense objection. 
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Before test results from a new device can be discussed by an 
expert witness, it is necessary that the device or test be accepted 
by the courts as scientifically sound enough to merit general 
approval of its reliability. Underlying this is the fear that a jury 
will accept a scientific device as absolutely reliable, without con-
sideration of any possible percentage of error in its operation 
which may have impact on the fact issues which they are to de-
cide. The most striking example of a device which fails to meet 
the standard of scientific reliability is the lie detector. Almost 
without exception American courts have denied admissibility for 
any purpose to testimony about the results of polygraph examin-
ation. 5 The operator is not permitted to testify to the conclusions 
he reached during his examination of the subject, nor is counsel 
permitted to make use of the results indirectly by referring to it 
in direct or impeaching examination of a witness.6 But the pro-
tection accorded the defendant here is limited to use of evidence 
in court.7 The police are not prohibited £:om using the lie detector 
as an investigating tool, and if the threat of a lie detector ex-
amination or confrontation of a suspect with the unfavorable re-
sults of such an examination induces him to confess,8 and no 
elements of force, threat or promise make the confession otherwise 
coerced and inadmissible,9 it is fully admissible in evidence. 
It is also necessary that a witness called to testify about a 
scientific test or device be qualified as an expert witness with 
reference to the things he testifies about. This is particularly im-
5 The leading case is State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933). Other 
recent cases include State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860 at 884, 46 N.W. (2d) 508 (1950); State 
v. Lowrey, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P. (2d) 147 (1947); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Cr. 45, 230 
P. (2d) 495 (1951). The only reported opinion in favor of unrestricted admissibility is 
People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S. (2d) 348 (1938), but this is probably overruled 
by People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E. (2d) 31 (1938). One court refused to reverse a 
criminal conviction when the defendant stipulated admission of lie detector results in 
evidence. People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. (2d) 686, 193 P. (2d) 937 (1948). To the contrary 
in a civil case, see Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W. (2d) 172 (1951), and in a criminal 
case, Le Fevre v. State, 242 Wis. 416, 8 N.W. (2d) 288 (1943). 
6A recent example of such indirect use is People v. Aragon, (Cal. App. 1957) 316 P. 
(2d) 370. 
7 Obviously this doctrine is not for the defendant's benefit, for it rules out lie detector 
results favorable to and offered by the defendant. Since the test itself is defective from 
a legal point of view, it does not exist as something recognized by the law or evidence. 
s Commonwealth v. Jones, 341 Pa. 541, 19 A. (2d) 389 (1941); State v. De Hart, 242 
Wis. 562, 8 N.W. (2d) 360 (1943). 
9 People v. Sims, 395 Ill. 69, 69 N.E. (2d) 336 (1946), and Bruner v. People, 113 Colo. 
194, 156 P. (2d) 111 (1945), are explainable on this ground. 
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portant in the first test case of a new scientific device. Failure to 
prove adequately the nature of the Harger drunkometer and to 
rebut defense testimony about possibilities of error inherent in the 
device produced a ruling in Michigan, 10 contrary to the rule ac-
cepted elsewhere,11 that it was as scientifically unsound as the lie 
detector. It is interesting to note that the greatest care is being 
exercised in producing expert scientific testimony about the radar 
speedmeter in the important test cases now being decided.12 Care-
ful preparation is causing the device to be upheld by the courts. 
After a device is accepted as sound, the prosecution case may still 
be jeopardized if a poorly qualified person conducts the tests. In 
such a case a verdict based on the evidence may be reversed, 13 and 
there is little question but that the weight of the testimony is 
affected adversely by inexperience on the part of the witness.14 
If the test or device is sufficiently sound and the expert witness 
properly qualified, the next consideration is whether or not the 
test was properly administered in the particular case and the 
possibility of substitution or influence by extraneous elements kept 
to a minimum. If, for example, the skin area from which a blood 
sample was obtained was first swabbed· with alcohol,15 or the 
speed-measuring device used to test the speed of a vehicle driven 
by a defendant was not carefully calibrated prior to the time the 
reading was taken, 16 vigorous cross-examination may weaken or 
make inadmissible such evidence. Where comparisons are made of 
fingerprints, bullets, weapons, tools, tire marks and other forensic 
evidence, the state must account for the custody of both the speci-
men taken at the scene of the crime and the comparison specimen 
10 People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38 N.W. (2d) 322 (1949). 
11 Lombness v. State, 95 Okla. Cr. 214, 243 P. (2d) 389 (1952); State v. Olivas, 77 
Ariz. 118, 267 P. (2d) 893 (1954); McKay v. State, 155 Tex. Cr. 416, 235 S.W. (2d) 173 
(1951); People v. Bobczyk, 343 Ill. App. 504, 99 N.E. (2d) 567 (1951); Commonwealth v. 
Hartman, 383 Pa. 461, 119 A. (2d) 211 (1956). 
12 State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570, 115 A. (2d) 35 (1955); State v. Moffitt, 48 Del. 210, 
100 A. (2d) 778 (1953). Lack of such expert testimony was fatal in People v. Torpey, 204 
Misc. 1023, 128 N.Y.S. (2d) 864 (1953). 
13 Hill v. State, 158 Tex. Cr. 313, 256 S.W. (2d) 93 (1953); Riddle v. State, (Okla. 
Cr. 1955) 288 P. (2d) 761. 
14 Omohundro v. Arlington County, 194 Va. 773, 75 S.E. (2d) 496 (1953). 
15 Cf. People v. Modell, 143 Cal. App. (2d) 724, 300 P. (2d) 204 (1956), and Pribyl 
v. State, (Neb. 1957) 87 N.W. (2d) 201. For similar procedural errors in using the drunko-
meter, see State v. Hunter, 4 N.J. Super. 531, 68 A. (2d) 274 (1949), and Hill v. State, 
158 Tex. Cr. 313, 256 S.W. (2d) 93 (1953). 
16 Cf. State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570, 115 A. (2d) 35 (1955), and People v. Sarver, 205 
Misc. 523, 129 N.Y.S. (2d) 9 (1954). 
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from the time of procurement to the time of trial, in order to en-
sure against mistake or substitution.17 If the chain of custody is 
broken the evidence will be ruled inadmissible. Although com-
paratively few cases apply these rules, knowledge that a careful 
defense attorney may secure rejection of scientific evidence in 
this way keeps police alert and careful in their procurement and 
retention of material for scientific comparison and testing. 
Sometimes otherwise competent evidence must be rejected be-
cause of some overriding policy of evidence law. Most often this 
policy is embodied in the form of a privilege which protects a 
right of privacy. The only privilege likely to be encountered in 
the area of scientific investigation is the statutory physician-patient 
privilege, which permits a patient to stop the mouth of a physician 
retained to treat or prescribe for him concerning what was de-
termined or said in the course of examination.18 Tests for intoxi-
cation are sometimes required to be administered by a licensed 
physician,19 and even in the absence of such a requirement they 
very commonly are so administered. On occasion, defendants have 
objected to testimony by the testing physician on the ground of 
privilege. In order to establish a claim of privilege it is necessary 
to show that the physician was retained for the purpose of diagnos-
ing and treating the claimant. If examination is at the instance 
of the prosecution, such a relationship does not exist.2° Further-
more, the relationship must be confidential. If persons are pres-
17 State v. Willis, 37 Wash. (2d) 274, 223 P. (2d) 453 (1950); People v. Sansalone, 208 
Misc. 491, 146 N.Y.S. (2d) 359 (1955); People v. Reenstierna, (N.H. 1958) 140 A. (2d) 572. 
18 The most complete discussion of this privilege is found in 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 
3d ed., §§2380-2391 (1940). On rare occasions the common law attorney-client privilege 
may apply. See 8 W1GMORE §§2290-2329. Results and reports of scientific experiments 
carried out at an attorney's request during preparation of the case are privileged, though 
the privilege does not extend to testimony by the experts who made the experiments; 
some other privilege must be found if they are to be kept from testifying. If officers 
impersonate an attorney in order to gain some advantage over a defendant, the lawyer-
client privilege may be invoked to silence them. Cf. People v. Barker, 60 Mich. 277, 
27 N.W. 539 (1886). Eavesdropping, however, is usually held to destroy the confidentiality 
required by the privilege, so that, for example, wiretapping or the use of a detectaphone 
does not violate the privilege, though they possibly violate other rules discussed later. 
Cf. Cal. Penal Code (Deering, Supp. 1957) §653i, which makes it a felony to eavesdrop 
on confidential communications. 
19 Idaho Code (1957) §49-354; Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1957) §8-1003; N.Y. Vehicle 
and Traffic Law (McKinney, Supp. 1958) §71-a; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1957) §483.630; Utah 
Code Ann. (Supp. 1957) §41-6-44.10; Va. Code (Supp. 1958) §18.75.1. 
20 Richter v. Hoglund, (7th Cir. 1943) 132 F. (2d) 748; Hanlon v. Woodhouse, 113 
Colo. 504, 160 P. (2d) 998 (1945); Block v. People, 125 Colo. 36, 240 P. (2d) 512 (1952). 
42 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 57 
ent other than to assist the doctor, the testimony is not privileged.21 
Further, the particular statement made or test carried through 
must be necessary to enable the doctor to diagnose and treat. Tests 
for intoxication are often, though logically not inevitably, con-
sidered unnecessary for treatment, and are therefore held to be 
unprivileged.22 Relatively few cases result in actual application 
of the privilege. Desire for certainty, however, probably causes 
metropolitan police departments to use a small core of trained 
doctors to administer such tests, which in turn tends to guarantee 
to a defendant that the tests at least will be safely administered by 
experts even though he cannot claim privilege to prevent them 
from testifying. 
Controls Created by Legislation 
On occasion statutes may create additional obstacles to the 
use of scientific evidence, either in court or absolutely. Sometimes 
legislation extends the general coverage of a principle of evidence 
law, with the incidental result of restricting the use of certain 
kinds of scientific evidence. Thus, for example, the creation by 
statute of the physician-patient privilege, by analogy to the com-
mon law attorney-client privilege, was not done with any thought 
of affecting the use of scientific evidence procured by a doctor.23 
But since the statutory language covers such a situation, it has 
been necessary for the courts to resolve the question of how far 
it in fact applies to such tests. 
Other statutes deal specifically with the conditions under which 
certain scientific tests must be carried out. For example, several 
states require that blood tests for intoxication be carried out only 
by a physician.24 Presumably results of a blood test carried out by 
a non-physician are inadmissible. Or inquiries into the sanity or 
mental condition of an individual may have to be carried out by 
21 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2381 (1940). Thus if police officers are present, the 
privilege probably does not attach. Iwerks v. People, 108 Colo. 556, 120 P. (2d) 961 (1942). 
22 Perry v. Hannagan, 257 Mich. 120, 241 N.W. 232 (1932); State v. Townsend, 146 
Kan. 982, 73 P. (2d) 1124 (1937). Statutory language may dictate a contrary conclusion 
however. Okla. Stat. Ann. (1937) tit. 12, §385; Clapp v. State, 73 Okla. Cr. 261, 120 P. 
(2d) 381 (1941). 
23 Rather, the purpose was to encourage full disclosure by the patient of everything 
necessary to enable the doctor to treat the case. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§2380, 
2380-a (1940). 
24 See the statutes in note 19 supra. 
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certain specified officials or by persons possessing certain profession-
al qualifications.25 
The maximum control is of course by legislation which pro-
hibits the use of a particular scientific device otherwise acceptable 
under the law of evidence.26 The most striking example is the 
legislative treatment of wiretapping. Prior to 1934 there was noth-
ing inherently wrong in the use of wiretaps so long as they were 
not placed physically on premises owned or in the possession of 
the defendant.27 But in 1934 Congress enacted section 605 of the 
Federal Communications Act28 which provides in part: 
" ... [A]nd no person not being authorized by the sender 
shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish 
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning 
of such intercepted communication to any person .... " 
Although there was no clear indication that wiretapping by police 
was considered by Congress at the time the statute was enacted29 
and although exceptions have been created by judicial interpreta-
tion of other regulatory statutes, absolute on their face, in favor 
of police and other governmental officials in the performance of 
their official duties,30 the United States Supreme Court held that 
taps placed by government agents were without authorization by 
the sender and that testimony by the officers about what they 
overheard would constitute divulgence within the meaning of 
the statute. Consequently, in order not to connive at the com-
25 E.g., 18 U.S.C. (1952) §4241: "A board of examiners for each Federal penal and 
correctional institution shall consist of (1) a medical officer appointed by the warden or 
superintendent of the institution; (2) a medical officer appointed by the Attorney General; 
and (3) a competent expert in mental diseases appointed by the Surgeon General of the 
United States Public Health Service." 18 U.S.C. (1952) §4244: " .•• [T]he court shall 
cause the accused, whether or not previously admitted to bail, to be examined as to his 
mental condition by at least one qualified psychiatrist, who shall report to the court .... " 
26 Legislation is also possible which permits the use of otherwise inadmissible evidence, 
but it is difficult to find legislation which goes this far, as opposed to that which liberalizes 
the conditions under which basically acceptable evidence is to be received. Compare the 
amendment of the Michigan Constitution (1908), Art. II, §10, to permit introduction into 
evidence of narcotics, firearms and explosives earlier proscribed under the Michigan 
interpretation of the search and seizure provision. 
27 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). If a trespass was involved the Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure exclusionary rule, discussed below, was invoked. 
28 48 Stat. 1103-1104 (1934), 47 U.S.C. (1952) §605. 
29 The Government so argued in Nardone v. United States (First Nardone Case), 
302 U.S. 379 (1937). See also -Rosenzweig, "The Law of Wiretapping,'' 32 CoRN. L. Q. 514 
at 532-535 (1947). 
so E.g., speed laws. State v. Gorham, 110 Wash. 330, 188 P. 457 (1920). 
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mission of a crime in the courtroom, evidence based on wiretap-
ping was declared illegal and inadmissible.31 On the face of it this 
would not have prevented use of wiretapping as a surveillance 
device so long as.a transcript of the overheard conversations was 
not offered in evidence. But soon afterward the Supreme Court 
held that all evidence derived from illegal wiretaps was equally 
inadmissible as "fruit of the poison tree,"32 which in effect makes 
wiretapping useless if a federal court case is to be built up around 
the information secured.33 
Prior to 1934 wiretap evidence was generally admissible in 
state courts. At least there was no indication on the part of state 
appellate courts that such testimony would be improper.84 Since 
the enactment and interpretation of the federal statute, state 
reaction has varied. A number of states have done nothing.35 A 
few states prohibit wiretapping and wiretap evidence in their 
courts.36 At least two states specifically provide for the placing 
of wiretaps pursuant to ex parte court order.37 The question nat-
urally arose as .to the admissibility of such evidence in state 
courts and the validity of state legislation which regulated or per-
mitted wiretapping. The first question was answered by Schwartz v. 
T exas,38 in which state officers had placed taps and had been per-
mitted to testify in a state criminal prosecution abqut what they 
31 Nardone v. United States, (First Nardone Case), 302 U.S. 379 (1937). Intrastate calls 
are also covered. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939). Monitoring of radio messages 
is also covered. United States v. Sugden, (9th Cir. 1955) 226 F. (2d) 281, affd. per curiam 
351 U.S. 916 (1956). 
82Nardone v. United States (Second Nardone Case), 308 U.S. 338 (1939). 
33 A good example is United States v. Coplon, (S.D. N.Y. 1950) 88 F. Supp. 921; 
(2d Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 629. Use of transcripts to induce a person to become a govern-
ment witness is, however, unobjectionable. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942). 
34 Rosenzweig, "The Law of Wiretapping," 33 CoRN. L. Q. 73-80 (1947). 
85 E.g., Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§750.539, 750.540. For typical state cases, see Leon 
v. State, 180 Md. 279, 23 A. (2d) 706 (1942); People v. Sica, 112 Cal. App. (2d) 574, 247 
P. (2d) 72 (1952); but cf. People v. Kelley, 22 Cal. (2d) 169, 137 P. (2d) 1 (1943); State v. 
Steadman, 216 S.C. 579, 59 S.E. (2d) 168 (1950). 
86 R. I. Gen. Laws (1956) §§11-35-12, 13; Ill. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1957) 
tit. 38, §§206.1 to 206.5. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. (Vernon, 1941) art. 727a, bars all 
illegally-obtained evidence. 
37 N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. (McKinney, 1958) §813-a; N.Y. CONST., Art I, §12. Ore. Rev. 
Stat. (1957) §§141.720 to 141.740. Evidence from any tap is admissible in criminal cases, 
Harlem Check Cashing Corp. v. Bell, 296 N.Y. 15, 68 N.E. (2d) 854 (1946); though not 
in civil cases, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §345-a. Oregon ,bars all such evidence. Ore. Rev. Stat. 
(1957) §41.910. Officers in both states who place taps without a court order commit a 
felony. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. (McKinney, 1958) §813-b; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1957) §165.540. 
38 344 U.S. 199 (1952). 
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overheard. Although the Supreme Court recognized that the of-
ficers had violated the federal statute, it held that the rule of ex-
clusion in federal courts is based on the Court's control over 
the federal judicial process. Lacking such power constitutionally to 
control state court practice, the exclusionary rule could not be 
applied to prohibit the use of wiretap evidence in a state court. 
This left untouched the question of the validity of state legis-
lation regulating or prohibiting wiretapping. Disturbing ques-
tions about this point have been raised by the recent case of 
Benanti v. United States.89 New York police officers had procured 
a court order40 authorizing them to tap Benanti's telephone and 
had overheard incriminating conversations. No federal officers 
participated in the tapping in any way. The state officers were 
called to testify in a federal prosecution against Benanti based 
in part on the statements overheard. The Supreme Court re-
versed the conviction, citing the basic proposition of the First 
Nardone Case that divulgence in court constitutes a violation of 
section 605. The Government, however, argued that the taps were 
placed properly under New York law, and that there was room for 
state regulation of wiretapping which should be recognized by 
the Court. But the Court held that state authorization must be held 
ineffectual, in that Congress had occupied the field to the exclusion 
of state power. The implication is that any state regulation, wheth-
er legalizing or prohibiting wiretapping, is unconstitutional as 
invading an area preempted by Congress under one of the dele-
gated powers.41 But Schwartz v. Texas remains undisturbed,42 
which suggests the incongruous result that evidence obtained ille-
gally in a ~tate which does not exclude it on that ground alone is 
in a more favored position than evidence admitted or rejected pur-
suant to state statute. How, if at all, this will be resolved is un-
certain, but in the meantime wiretapping must be considered a sur-
veillance technique fraught with danger to the prosecution if 
criminal charges arising from or to be proved even in part or in-
39 355 U.S. 96 (1957). 
40 Under the statute cited in note 37 supra. 
41 The Court cited Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), which voided state 
subversive control legislation consistent with federal legislation, Hill v. Florida ex rel. 
Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945), which held a state law for licensing of business agents and 
registration of unions incompatible with the National Labor Relations Act, and Hines 
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), which struck down a state alien registration law. 
~ Footnote 19 of the opinion so indicates. Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 at 
106 (1957). 
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directly by the overheard conversations are m any way con-
templated. 
Wiretapping does not include within it all types of electronic 
or mechanical eavesdropping by police. Only the electronic cir-
cuit is protected by the federal statute. It is therefore unobjection-
able to use a detectaphone or other device which picks up sound 
waves mechanically,43 so long as the device is not placed on premises 
of the defendant. Listening or recording from one end of the line, 
at least with authorization of one of the parties to the conversa-
tion, does not violate section 605.44 And there is no objection to 
using a small portable transmitter for the purpose of transmitting 
conversation with a suspect to officers holding a receiver, so long 
as the defendant's property is not trespassed upon.45 The same 
thing holds true for long-range observation by searchlight, binoc-
ulars or ca~era.46 
Control by Constitutional Provisions 
The Constitution of the United States and the constitutions 
of most of the states contain a number of procedural guarantees to 
criminal defendants. The three which have the greatest potential 
effect on the use of scientific evidence are the search and seizure 
provision, the privilege against self-incrimination and the due 
process clause. 
Unreasonable Search and Seizure. The constitutions general-
ly protect persons against unreasonable searches and seizures.47 
Search warrants may issue only upon probable cause supported 
by oath describing particularly the person or thing to be seized 
and the premises to be searched. Any search and seizure carried 
through under an invalid search warrant or improperly under 
a valid search warrant are unconstitutional. The more actively 
litigated question, however, is what constitutes an unreasonable 
search. Arrests without warrant have been legally possible since 
before the adoption of the several constitutional provisions, and 
at least some search incident to a valid arrest is also legally 
43 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). 
44 Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957). 
45 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). 
46 United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927). 
47 U.S. CONST., Amend. IV, sets the pattern. 
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permissible.48 If, however, a person is detained improperly, the 
seizure of his person, the ensuing search, and the seizure of 
articles to be used in evidence are all unreasonable and therefore 
unconstitutional.49 If the arrest is valid, but the search extends 
beyond the person or immediate presence of the arrested person, 
the search and the seizure are unreasonable and ~nconstitutional.50 
One may say, therefore, that constitutional searches are limited 
to cases of legal arrest with or without warrant in which only 
the person of, things carried by, and room occupied at the time 
of arrest by the arrested person are searched. 51 
The constitutional provisions contain no remedy for viola-
tions. Prior to 1914 redress for unconstitutional conduct had to be 
sought in the form of civil actions against or prosecution of the 
offending officers. But in 1914 the United States Supreme Court 
decided that the traditional forms of relief were inadequate. Since 
unconstitutional police conduct is most often motivated by the 
desire to procure evidence upon which to secure a conviction of 
crime, the Court reasoned that if the motivation was removed 
the practices would diminish or cease entirely. Therefore, the 
Court ruled that evidence obtained through an unconstitutional 
search and seizure is thereby inadmissible as evidence in any 
federal court.52 Several of the states immediately followed the 
lead of the United States Supreme Court in the interpretation of 
their own state constitutional provisions,53 and in recent years 
an additional number of states have made a similar change.54 The 
exclusionary rule, however, is a rule of evidence adopted in the 
exercise of the power to control procedure and practice, so that 
it cannot be called a requirement of due process of law binding on 
the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.55 
48 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
49 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
50 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). 
51 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
52 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
53 The state of law in each state prior to 1949 is summarized in the Appendix to 
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
54 The most striking change was in California, rwhere People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. (2d) 
434, 282 P. (2d) 905 (1955), reversed a long line of cases rejecting the exclusionary rule. 
The same thing occurred earlier in Delaware. Rickards v. State, 45 Del. 573, 77 A. (2d) 
199 (1950). Three states have adopted the rule by statute. N.C. Gen. Stat. (1953) §15-27; 
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. (Vernon, 1941) Art. 727a; R.I. Gen. Laws (1956) §9-19-25. Maryland 
has adopted the rule for misdemeanor cases, with several qualifications discussed in 
Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954). 
55 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
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In jurisdictions, therefore, having the exclusionary rule, any 
evidence, including scientific, obtained in violation of a defend-
ant's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is 
inadmissible. Thus, comparison of handwriting specimens and bal-
listics tests are clearly proper under the law of evidence. But if 
one.of the comparison specimens is obtained while the defendant 
is improperly under arrest or by an illegal search of his house, it 
becomes inadmissible56 and the expert's testimony becomes im-
possible for want of things in evidence to compare. Blood tests 
for intoxication are scientifically valid, but if a sample is taken 
without consent from a person under illegal detention, evidence 
about the illegally-obtained sample will be unavailable in court.57 
Use of a detectaphone does not violate the Federal Communica-
tions Act, but if it is placed on the defendant's premises by an act 
of trespass, the results obtained by its use are unavailable to the 
prosecution.58 Thus all kinds of evidence, scientific and otherwise, 
are controlled by the exclusionary rule. Conversely, if a state does 
not have the exclusionary rule, police are not hampered by any 
restriction on admissibility of evidence not found in the law of 
evidence or by virtue of a special statute. 59 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination. The law of every state 
contains the equivalent to the language of the Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution: "No person ... shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . . " 
In most states the privilege, in line with its historical development, 
applies only to "testimonial utterances" compelled in some kind of 
formal proceeding. 00 Nevertheless, some jurisdictions have read 
into the privilege the concept that no person shall be the unwilling 
~ource of evidence against himself. Though the position is seldom 
consistently maintained, some courts have excluded evidence of 
physical examinations, 61 blood specimens62 and the like. Others 
have interpreted the privilege to prohibit affirmative acts from 
56 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). 
57 United States v. Willis, (S.D. Cal. 1949) 85 F. Supp. 745; State v. Weltha, 228 Iowa 
519, 292 N.W. 148 (1940) (semble). 
58 Cf. the discussion in Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438 (1928). 
59 State v. Alexander, 7 N.J. 585, 83 A. (2d) 441 (1951). 
60 The cases are gathered in 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2265 (1940). 
61State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902); State v. Newcomb, 220 Mo. 
54, 119 s.w. 405 (1909). 
62 Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Cr. 593, 146 S.W. (2d) 381 (1940); People v. Dennis, 
131 Misc. 62, 226 N.Y.S. 689 (1928). 
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being required of a suspect, but not to protect his person from be-
ing the passive source of evidence. Thus to be required to make 
tracks for comparison is in violation of the privilege, but to have 
one's shoes removed forcibly is not.63 In most states, however, priv-
ilege poses no problem in the acquisition of material on which 
scientific tests are to be made. 
Conceptually, however, a more serious problem is presented 
when a defendant is required to write handwriting specimens for 
comparison, or required to answer questions during an examina-
tion to determine mental condition at the time of a criminal act. 
In both instances a defendant is required to make utterances which 
may result in evidence against him. However, against application 
of the privilege it may be argued either that the defendant has 
in fact an option to refuse to write or speak, so that if he does so 
his privilege is waived, or that the statements he makes are not 
in fact to be used as evidence against him, but rather serve as 
raw data for determination of a fact not actually referred to in 
the substance of the statements stemming from defendant. What-
ever the reason, courts have generally upheld the procurement of 
such evidence as not violative of the privilege. 64 
Any constitutional guarant~e for the protection of a defendant 
can be waived. One of the more interesting recent legislative 
developments is that of compulsory waiver of privilege in cases 
arising out of use of the highways. Use of the highways is a priv-
ilege afforded to and not a right of the citizen. 65 Several states 
have enacted that any person who holds an operator's permit is 
deemed to have consented to the taking of any blood, urine or 
breath specimen whenever there is reason to believe he is in-
toxicated. 66 Refusal in fact to consent is ground for revocation of 
the permit after hearing. The device has been held constitutional, 67 
63 State v. Griffin, 129 S.C. 200, 124 S.E. 81 (1924); Aiken v. State, 16 Ga. App. 848, 
86 S.E. 1076 (1913). 
64 Beltran v. Samson and Jose, 53 Phil. Is. 570 (1929); Clark v. United States, (5th 
Cir. 1923) 293 F. 301; State v. Barnard, 176 Minn. 349, 223 N.W. 452 (1929). 
65 People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N.Y. 115, 102 N.E. 530 (1913); Larr v. Dignan, 317 
Mich. 121, 26 N.W. (2d) 872 (1947); Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606 (1903). 
66 Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1957) §8-1001; N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law (McKinney, 
Supp. 1958) §71-a; Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1957) §41-6-44.10. Other states require actual 
consent. Ore. Rev. Stat. (1957) §483.630; Va. Code (Supp. 1958) §18.75.1. 
67 At least if the arrest is legally proper, and proper hearing is given before license 
revocation. Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 271, 143 N.Y.S. (2d) 257 (1955); People v. 
Kovacik, 205 Misc. 275, 128 N.Y.S. (2d) 492 (1954). 
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and thus ensures that police authorities will have free access to the 
best kind of evidence of intoxication, provided they comply with 
the statutory requirements as to the method of procuring test 
samples. 
Due Process of Law. Under federal and state constitutions "no 
person . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law."68 The impact of the clause on criminal pro-
cedure in general is great, and it serves as the chief medium of 
control of state procedure by the federal courts. It applies, how-
ever, to use of scientific investigatory devices in two primary 
areas. 
One arises out of the doctrine which holds use of a coerced 
confession in a criminal case to be a denial of due process.69 Police 
brutality and the use of psychic pressures to procure confessions 
can of course scarcely be called "scientific" techniques of investiga-
tion. But the use of hypnosis and narcosis is on occasion relied 
on to obtain a statement from one suspected of having committed 
a crime. Where confessions have been so obtained they have 
been to date struck down as coerced and held inadmissible under 
the due process clause.70 If, however, a psychiatrist or psychologist 
examining a person to determine his mental condition uses either 
technique, he may testify to the conclusions he reached about the 
subject's condition.71 Thus the technique is scientifically sound 
enough to support a professional conclusion, at least for ancillary 
use, but is deemed untrustworthy when used to elicit a confession 
for police use, and serves to violate due process of law require-
ments as well. 
The second covers extraction of evidence from the person by 
violent methods. In Rochin v. California12 the Supreme Court was 
confronted by a case in which state officers had pumped the stom-
68 U.S. CONST., Amend. V (binding on federal authorities) and Amend. XIV (binding 
on states). The former sets the pattern for state constitutional equivalents. 
69 Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); 
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
70 Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Lindsey v. United States, (9th Cir. 1956) 237 
F. (2d) 893; State v. Lindemuth, 56 N.M. 257, 243 P. (2d) 325 (1952); People v. Leyra, 
302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E. (2d) 553 (1951); State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860, 46 N.W. (2d) 508 (1950). 
71 People v. Esposito, 287 N.Y. 389, 39 N.E. (2d) 925 (1942), but cf. People v. Ford, 
304 ,N.Y. 679, 107 N.E. (2d) 595 (1952). The former involved testimony on the ancillary 
question of whether or not defendants were sane enough to stand trial. The latter case 
rejected such testimony submitted on the question of insanity at the time of the criminal 
act charged. Cf. People v. Speaks, (Cal. App. 1958) 319 P. (2d) 709. 
12 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
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ach of a person, suspected of possessing narcotics, who was seen to 
swallow something immediately before he was illegally arrested. 
California did not then have the exclusionary rule, so that evidence 
of the narcotic content of the stomach was used to convict him of 
a violation of state law. The Supreme Court did not see fit to 
reverse its earlier position that Fourteenth Amendment due proc-
ess does not require the states to adopt the exclusionary rule in 
cases where unreasonable search and seizure had been carried 
through.73 Rather, it held that evidence obtained through physi-
cal violence which shocks the conscience, which results from 
"methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of consti-
tutional differentiation,"74 violates due process of law if admitted 
in a criminal case. How far the doctrine goes to prohibit non-
consensual acquisition of evidence from the person of a suspect 
remains to be seen.75 It was specifically held not to apply to the 
taking of blood, breath and urine specimens to determine intox-
ication.76 Two intermediate courts of appeal have held it in-
applicable to rectal examination which revealed narcotics in sup-
positories. 77 To how many kinds of unpleasant physical examin-
ation the Rochin rule will be held applicable, particularly after 
the Breithaupt case, is uncertain, but that it serves as a potential 
check to calloused or dangerous examination at the hands of 
police ought not be minimized.78 
73 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
74 342 U.S. 165 at 172 (1952). 
75 It does not cover invasion of a defendant's home as opposed to his person. Irvine 
v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), in which officers placed concealed microphones and 
recording equipment throughout the defendant's home. 
76 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). The four dissenting justices felt that 
this left no real room for the Rochin rule to operate. It is difficult to see how United 
States v. Townsend, (D.C. D.C. 1957) 151 F. Supp. 378, which excluded results of blood 
tests based on swabbings from a rape suspect's genitals, can be reconciled with Breithaupt 
v.Abram. 
77 Blackford v. United States, (9th Cir. 1957) 247 F. (2d) 745; Application of Woods, 
(D.C. Cal. 1957) 154 F. Supp. 932; People v. Woods, 139 Cal. App. (2d) 515, 293 P. (2d) 
901 (1956). In both instances the defendants were under lawful arrest and external 
physical examination indicated clearly that something had been inserted through the 
anus. See also State v. Pierce, (Vt. 1958) 141 A. (2d) 419. 
78 "This is not to say that the indiscriminate taking of blood under different condi-
tions or by those not competent to do so may not amount to such 'brutality' as would 
come under the Rochin rule. The chief law-enforcement officer of New Mexico, while 
at the Bar of this Court, assured us that every proper medical precaution is afforded an 
accused from whom blood is taken." 352 U.S. at 437-438. The California court relied on 
Rochin in part in People v. Speaks, (Cal. App. 1958) 319 P. (2d) 709. 
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Conclusion 
Methods of obtaining are of considerable importance in deter-
mining admissibility of evidence, the scientific reliability of which 
has been otherwise established. The status of the several kinds 
of investigative techniques may be summarized as follows: 
Scientific Interrogation. Though most experts feel the poly-
graph to be reliable,79 the courts have not felt that it is. With the 
possible exception of a case in which both sides stipulate for their 
use, so polygraph test results cannot be used or referred to in any 
way. Hypnosis anp. narcosis, however, are recognized at least in-
directly as scientifically sound methods of determining mental 
condition, where an expert opinion is to be expressed. If, however, 
statements admitting guilt are so . procured, they are likely to be 
deemed coerced in violation of the due process clauses. Should any 
or all of the three methods come to be recognized as proper in 
securing statements, a possible question of the privilege against 
self-incrimination arises.81 Results of such interrogation by federal 
officers during illegal custody of an arrested person may also fall 
afoul of the evidentiary exclusion rule arising from the prompt pro-
duction provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.82 
Physiological Examination. The scientific accuracy of tests, 
chemical and mechanical, of body tissues, fluids, breath and the 
like is unimpeachable. If, however, samples are obtained in the 
course of an unlawful arrest, the subject's constitutional rights 
have been violated, and if the jurisdiction pursuant to whose 
authority the investigating officers purport to act has in force the 
exclusionary rule, results of the tests performed on the sample are 
79 For a dissent on this proposition, see Levitt, "Scientific Evaluation of the 'Lie 
Detector,'" 40 IowA L. REv. 440 (1955). 
80 People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. (2d) 686, 193 P. (2d) 937-(1948). 
81 However, the answers are not being required by a regular constituted hearing 
body, answers must be voluntarily given so that the waiver doctrine applies, and the 
important thing in any event is not the answers which the subject gives, but rather 
the physiological or mental condition which accompanies the words. Statements showing 
guilt elicited under narcosis or 'hypnosis required by court order might well be held 
within the privilege unless the waiver doctrine were invoked. 
82 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. (1952) rule 5(a) requires an arrested 
person to ,be taken before a United States commissioner "without unnecessary delay." To 
discourage federal officers from violating this requirement, the Supreme Court has ruled 
out all statements taken from a person in unlawful detention in violation of the rule, 
without regard to their voluntary character. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948). 
The method used in obtaining the statement should be immaterial if the test is unlawful 
detention at the time. 
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inadmissible as evidence. In the remaining jurisdictions such evi-
dence is fully admissible regardless of the circumstances under 
which it was obtained. Occasionally the privilege against self-
incrimination may be invoked to prevent use of specimens taken 
without consent from a subject under either lawful or illegal 
detention, although the number of jurisdictions in which this is 
possible is small. If, however, undue violence or crudity is used 
in procuring such evidence, the rule of the Rochin case may be 
invoked in either state or federal courts. 
Forensic Evidence. The accuracy of ballistics tests and of com-
parison tests between hand·writing and typewriting specimens, 
fingerprints, tire marks, footprints, tool marks, hairs, fingernail 
parings, fibers, fabrics, dust and dirt samples, vegetable matter and 
the like is well enough established that expert testimony about 
them is everywhere admissible, provided the particular tests have 
been accurately made and possibility of substitution of samples 
guarded against.83 Comparison specimens obtained in the course 
of an unreasonable search and seizure may not be discussed in 
evidence in jurisdictions following the federal exclusionary rule. 
Arguments based on the privilege against self-incrimination are 
rarely accepted, and the rule of the Rochin case seems inapplicable. 
Electronic Surveillance. Wiretapping, radio monitoring, use of 
portable transmitters, and the radar speedmeter are all scientifi-
cally exact enough to be recognized judicially. If, however, such 
devices are used during the course of a trespass on the defendant's 
property, the results will be inadmissible by the exclusionary rule 
of unreasonable search and seizure. And the Federal Communica-
tions Act, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, 
limits use of wiretap evidence only to those state courts willing or 
able under state law to receive evidence from any source whatever. 
One may, of course, argue that whatever is potentially relevant 
to resolution of any fact issue in a criminal case should be received 
by a court. One certainly has excellent historical and policy reasons 
for questioning any application whatever of the privilege against 
self-incrimination to non-verbal evidence from a defendant. In 
particular one may quarrel with the exclusionary rule which usual-
ly results in emasculating the case against a man who has com-
mitted a crime because police officers have themselves committed 
83 The latter requirement applies also to specimens procured through physiological 
examination. 
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unlawful acts, thus in effect benefitting the guilty and not the 
innocent who are relegated to civil action or criminal prosecution 
of the officers involved.84 Such arguments, however, are beside the 
point if one considers the question of the status of scientific inves-
tigation today. Defendants do have statutory and constitutional 
rights, and exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of such 
rights is recognized to such an extent that one must conclude that 
pursuit of scientific truth without regard for human rights and 
sensibilities is, and probably should be, a matter for the laboratory 
and not the courtroom. 
84 See Waite, "Judges and the Crime Burden," 54 MICH. L. REv. 169 (1955). 
